"Government, in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state, an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, which we might expect in a country without a government, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer." – Thomas Paine
Bacteria are unicellular organisms. They vary in shape and size from spherical cells - cocci - with a diameter of 0.5-1.0 µ m (micrometer), to long rod-shaped organisms - bacilli - which may be from 1-5 µ m in size. Chains of bacilli may exceed 50 µ m in length. The shape of the bacterial cell is determined by the rigid cell wall. The interior of the cell contains the nuclear material (DNA), cytoplasm, and cell membrane, that are necessary for the life of the bacterium. Many bacteria also have glycoproteins on their outer surfaces which aid in bacterial attachment to cell surface receptors. Under special circumstances some types of bacteria can transform into spores. The spore of the bacterial cell is more resistant to cold, heat, drying, chemicals and radiation than the vegetative bacterium itself. Spores are a dormant form of the bacterium and, like the seeds of plants, they can germinate when conditions are favorable.
The term rickettsia generally applies to very small, gram-negative coccobacillary organisms of the genera Rickettsia and Coxiella. Rickettsiae are unique from classical bacteria in their inability to grow (with rare exceptions) in the absence of a living host cell, but many are susceptible to treatment with antibiotics. Bacteria generally cause disease in human beings and animals by one of two mechanisms: by invading host tissues, and by producing poisons (toxins). Many pathogenic bacteria utilize both mechanisms. The diseases they produce often respond to specific therapy with antibiotics. It is important to distinguish between the disease- causing organism and the name of the disease it causes (in parentheses below).
This manual covers several of the bacteria or rickettsiae considered to be potential BW threat agents: Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax), Brucella spp. (Brucellosis), Burkholderia mallei (Glanders), Burholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis), Yersinia pestis (Plague), Francisella tularensis (Tularemia), and Coxiella burnetii (Q Fever). Page 21
Signs and Symptoms: Incubation period is generally 1-6 days, although longer periods have been noted. Fever, malaise, fatigue, cough and mild chest discomfort progresses to severe respiratory distress with dyspnea, diaphoresis, stridor, cyanosis, and shock. Death typically occurs within 24-36 hours after onset of severe symptoms.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE Anthrax spores were weaponized by the United States in the 1950's and 1960's before the old U.S. offensive program was terminated. Other countries have weaponized this agent or are suspected of doing so. Anthrax bacteria are easy to cultivate and spore production is readily induced. Moreover, the spores are highly resistant to sunlight, heat and disinfectants - properties which could be advantageous when choosing a bacterial weapon. Iraq admitted to a United Nations inspection team in August of 1991 that it had performed research on the offensive use of B. anthracis prior to the Persian Gulf War, and in 1995 Iraq admitted to weaponizing anthrax.
A recent defector from the former Soviet Union's biological weapons program revealed that the Soviets had produced anthrax in ton quantities for use as a weapon. This agent could be produced in either a wet or dried form, stabilized for weaponization by an adversary and delivered as an aerosol cloud either from a line source such as an aircraft flying upwind of friendly positions, or as a point source from a spray device. Coverage of a large ground area could also be theoretically facilitated by multiple spray bomblets disseminated from a missile warhead at a predetermined height above the ground.
Signs and Symptoms: Pneumonic plague begins after an incubation period of
1-6 days, with high fever, chills, headache, malaise, followed by cough (often with hemoptysis), progressing rapidly to dyspnea, stridor, cyanosis, and death. Gastrointestinal symptoms are often present. Death results from respiratory failure, circulatory collapse, and a bleeding diathesis. Bubonic plague, featuring high fever, malaise, and painful lymph nodes (buboes) may progress spontaneously to the septicemic form (septic shock, thrombosis, DIC) or to the pneumonic form.
bubonic plague, and Respiratory Droplet Precautions for suspected pneumonic plague. Y. pestis can survive in the environment for varying periods, but is susceptible to heat, disinfectants, and exposure to sunlight. Soap and water is effective if decon is needed. Take measures to prevent local disease cycles if vectors (fleas) and reservoirs (rodents) are present.
Q FEVER SUMMARY Signs and Symptoms: Fever, cough, and pleuritic chest pain may occur as early as ten days after exposure. Patients are not generally critically ill, and the illness lasts from 2 days to 2 weeks. Diagnosis: Q fever is not a clinically distinct illness and may resemble a viral illness or other types of atypical pneumonia. The diagnosis is confirmed serologically. Treatment: Q fever is generally a self-limited illness even without treatment, but tetracycline or doxycycline should be given orally for 5 to 7 days to prevent complications of the disease. Q fever endocarditis (rare) is much more difficult to treat.
OVERVIEW The endemic form of Q fever is a zoonotic disease caused by the rickettsia, Coxiella burnetii. Its natural reservoirs are sheep, cattle, goats, dogs, cats and birds. The organism grows to especially high concentrations in placental tissues. The infected animals do not develop the disease, but do shed large numbers of the organisms in placental tissues and body fluids including milk, urine, and feces. Exposure to infected animals at parturition is an important risk factor for endemic disease. Humans acquire the disease by inhalation of aerosols contaminated with the organisms.
Farmers and abattoir workers are at greatest risk occupationally. A biological warfare attack with Q fever would cause a disease similar to that occurring naturally. Q fever is also a significant hazard in laboratory personnel who are working with the organism.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
Q fever was first described in Australia and called “Query fever” because the causative agent was initially unknown. Coxiella burnetii, discovered in 1937, is a rickettsial organism that is resistant to heat and desiccation and highly infectious by the aerosol route. A single inhaled organism may produce clinical illness. For all of these reasons, Q fever could be used by an adversary as an incapacitating biological warfare agent.
Signs and Symptoms: Ulceroglandular tularemia presents with a local ulcer and regional lymphadenopathy, fever, chills, headache and malaise. Typhoidal tularemia presents with fever, headache, malaise, substernal discomfort, prostration, weight loss and a non-productive cough.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
Tularemia was recognized in Japan in the early 1800’s and in Russia in 1926. In the early 1900’s, American workers investigating suspected plague epidemics in San Francisco isolated the organism and named it Bacterium tularense after Tulare County, California where the work was performed. Dr. Edward Francis, USPHS, established the cause of deer-fly fever as Bacterium tularense and subsequently devoted his life to researching the organism and disease, hence, the organism was later renamed Francisella tularensis Francisella tularensis was weaponized by the United States in the 1950's and 1960's during the U.S. offensive biowarfare program, and other countries are suspected to have weaponized this agent. This organism could potentially be stabilized for weaponization by an adversary and theoretically produced in either a wet or dried form, for delivery against U.S. forces in a similar fashion to the other bacteria discussed in this handbook.
Signs and Symptoms: Clinical manifestations begin acutely with malaise, fever, rigors, vomiting, headache, and backache. 2-3 days later lesions appear which quickly progress from macules to papules, and eventually to pustular vesicles. They are more abundant on the extremities and face, and develop synchronously.
Smallpox is caused by the Orthopox virus, variola, which occurs in at least two strains, variola major and the milder disease, variola minor. Despite the global eradication of smallpox and continued availability of a vaccine, the potential weaponization of variola continues to pose a military threat. This threat can be attributed to the aerosol infectivity of the virus, the relative ease of large-scale production, and an increasingly Orthopoxvirus-naive populace. Although the fully developed cutaneous eruption of smallpox is unique, earlier stages of the rash could be mistaken for varicella. Secondary spread of infection constitutes a nosocomial hazard from the time of onset of a smallpox patient's exanthem until scabs have separated. Quarantine with respiratory isolation should be applied to secondary contacts for 17 days post-exposure. Vaccinia vaccination and vaccinia immune globulin each possess some efficacy in post-exposure prophylaxis.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
Endemic smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980 by the World Health Organization (WHO). Although two WHO-approved repositories of variola virus remain at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta and the Institute for Viral Preparations in Moscow, the extent of clandestine stockpiles in other parts of the world remains unknown. In January 1996, WHO’s governing board recommended that all stocks of smallpox be destroyed by 30 June 1999. However, action on this was delayed by the Clinton administration in May 1999 due to concerns over the need for further study of the virus given its potential as a biological warfare agent. The smallpox stockpiles are now scheduled for destruction on 30 June 2002.
The United States stopped vaccinating its military population in 1989 and civilians in the early 1980s. These populations are now susceptible to variola major, although recruits immunized in 1989 may retain some degree of immunity. Variola may have been used by the British Army against native Americans by giving them contaminated blankets from the beds of smallpox victims during the eighteenth century. Japan considered the use of smallpox as a BW weapon in World War II and it has been considered as a possible threat agent against US forces for many years. In addition, the former Soviet Union is reported to have produced and stockpiled massive quantities of the virus for use as a biological weapon. It is not known whether these stockpiles still exist in Russia.
VENEZUELAN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS
Signs and Symptoms: Incubation period 1-6 days. Acute systemic febrile illness with encephalitis developing in a small percentage (4% children; < 1% adults). Generalized malaise, spiking fevers, rigors, severe headache, photophobia, and myalgias for 24-72 hours. Nausea, vomiting, cough, sore throat, and diarrhea may follow. Full recovery from malaise and fatigue takes 1-
2 weeks. The incidence of CNS disease and associated morbidity and mortality would be much higher after a BW attack.
The Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus complex is a group of eight mosquito-borne alphaviruses that are endemic in northern South America and Trinidad and causes rare cases of human encephalitis in Central America, Mexico, and Florida. These viruses can cause severe diseases in humans and Equidae (horses, mules, burros and donkeys). Natural infections are acquired by the bites of a wide variety of mosquitoes. Equidae serve as amplifying hosts and source of mosquito infection.
Western and Eastern Equine Encephalitis viruses are similar to the VEE complex, are often difficult to distinguish clinically, and share similar aspects of transmission and epidemiology. The human infective dose for VEE is considered to be 10-100 organisms, which is one of the principal reasons that VEE is considered a militarily effective BW agent. Neither the population density of infected mosquitoes nor the aerosol concentration of virus particles has to be great to allow significant transmission of VEE in a BW attack. There is no evidence of direct human-to-human or horse-to-human transmission. Natural aerosol transmission is not known to occur. VEE particles are not considered stable in the environment, and are thus not as persistent as the bacteria responsible for Q fever, tularemia or anthrax. Heat and standard disinfectants can easily kill the VEE virus complex.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
Between 1969 and 1971, an epizootic of a "highly pathogenic strain" of VEE emerged in Guatemala, moved through Mexico, and entered Texas in June
1971. This strain was virulent in both equine species and humans. In Mexico, there were 8,000-10,000 equine deaths, "tens of thousands" of equine cases, and 17,000 human cases (no human deaths). Over 10,000 horses in Texas died. Once the Texas border was breached, a national emergency was declared and resources were mobilized to vaccinate equines in 20 states (95% of all horses and donkeys were vaccinated; over 3.2 million animals), establish equine quarantines, and control mosquito populations with broad-scale insecticide use in the Rio Grande Valley and along the Gulf Coast. A second VEE outbreak in
1995 in Venezuela and Columbia involved over 75,000 human cases and over
VEE is better characterized than EEE or WEE, primarily because it was tested as a BW agent during the U.S. offensive program in the 1950's and
1960's. Other countries have also been or are suspected to have weaponized this agent. In compliance with President Nixon's National Security Decision No. 35 of November 1969 to destroy the BW microbial stockpile, all existing stocks of VEE in the U.S. were publicly destroyed.
These viruses could theoretically be produced in large amounts in either a wet or dried form by relatively unsophisticated and inexpensive systems. This form of the VEE virus complex could be intentionally disseminated as an aerosol and would be highly infectious. It could also be spread by the purposeful dissemination of infected mosquitoes, which can probably transmit the virus throughout their lives. The VEE complex is relatively stable during the storage and manipulation procedures necessary for weaponization. In natural human epidemics, severe and often fatal encephalitis in Equidae (30-90% mortality) always precedes disease in humans.
However, a biological warfare attack with virus intentionally disseminated as an aerosol would most likely cause human disease as a primary event or simultaneously with Equidae. During natural epidemics, illness or death in wild or free ranging Equidae may not be recognized before the onset of human disease, thus a natural epidemic could be confused with a BW event, and data on onset of disease should be considered with caution. A more reliable method for determining the likelihood of a BW event would be the presence of VEE outside of its natural geographic range.
[WEST NILE VIRUS EPIDEMIC...???]
A biological warfare attack in a region populated by Equidae and appropriate mosquito vectors could initiate an epizootic/epidemic.
VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS
Signs and Symptoms: VHFs are febrile illnesses which can feature flushing of the face and chest, petechiae, bleeding, edema, hypotension, and shock. Malaise, myalgias, headache, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur in any of the hemorrhagic fevers.
The viral hemorrhagic fevers are a diverse group of illnesses caused by RNA viruses from four viral families. The Arenaviridae include the etiologic agents of Argentine, Bolivian, and Venezuelan hemorrhagic fevers, and Lassa fever. The Bunyaviridae include the members of the Hantavirus genus, the Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever virus from the Nairovirus genus, and the Rift Valley fever virus from the Phlebovirus genus; the Filoviridae include Ebola and Marburg viruses; and the Flaviviridae include dengue and yellow fever viruses. These viruses are spread in a variety of ways; some may be transmitted to humans through a respiratory portal of entry. Although evidence for weaponization does not exist for many of these viruses, they are included in this handbook because of their potential for aerosol dissemination or weaponization, or likelihood for confusion with similar agents that might be weaponized.
Toxins are harmful substances produced by living organisms (animals, plants, microbes). Features that distinguish them from chemical agents, such as VX, cyanide, or mustard, include being not man-made, non-volatile (no vapor hazard), usually not dermally active (mycotoxins are the exception), and generally much more toxic per weight than chemical agents. Their lack of volatility is very important and makes them unlikely to produce either secondary or person-to-person exposures, or a persistent environmental hazard. A toxin’s utility as an aerosol weapon is determined by its toxicity, stability, and ease of production.
The bacterial toxins, such as botulinum toxins, are the most toxic substances by weight known (Appendix I). Less toxic compounds, such as the mycotoxins, are thousands of times less toxic than botulinum, and have limited aerosol potential. The relationship between aerosol toxicity and the quantity of toxin required for an effective open-air exposure is shown in Appendix J, which demonstrates that for some agents such as the mycotoxins and ricin, very large quantities (tons) would be needed for an effective open-air attack. Stability limits the open-air potential of some toxins. For example, botulinum and tetanus toxins are large molecular weight proteins, and are easily denatured by environmental factors (heat, dessication, UV light), thus posing little downwind threat.
Finally, some toxins, such as saxitoxin, might be both stable and highly toxic, but are so difficult to extract that they can only feasibly be produced in minute quantities. As with all biological weapons, potential to cause incapacitation as well as lethality must be considered. Depending on the goals of an adversary, incapacitating agents may be more effective than lethal agents due to the overwhelming demand on the medical and evacuation infrastructure, or the expected panic in the population. Several toxins such as SEB, cause significant illness at doses much lower than that required for lethality, and thus pose a significant incapacitating threat. This manual will cover four toxins considered to be among the most likely to be used against U.S. military and civilian targets: botulinum toxins, ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), and T-2 mycotoxins.
Signs and Symptoms: Usually begins with cranial nerve palsies, including ptosis, blurred vision, diplopia, dry mouth and throat, dysphagia, and dysphonia. This is followed by symmetrical descending flaccid paralysis, with generalized weakness and progression to respiratory failure. Symptoms begin as early as
12-36 hours after inhalation, but may take several days after exposure to low doses of toxin.
STAPHYLOCOCCAL ENTEROTOXIN B
Signs and Symptoms: Latent period of 3-12 hours after aerosol exposure is followed by sudden onset of fever, chills, headache, myalgia, and nonproductive cough. Some patients may develop shortness of breath and retrosternal chest pain. Patients tend to plateau rapidly to a fairly stable clinical state. Fever may last 2 to 5 days, and cough may persist for up to 4 weeks. Patients may also present with nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea if they swallow the toxin. Presumably, higher exposure can lead to septic shock and death.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
SEB is the second most common source of outbreaks of food poisoning. Often these outbreaks occur in a setting such as a church picnic or other community event, due to common source exposure in which contaminated food is consumed. Although an aerosolized SEB toxin weapon would not likely produce significant mortality, it could render 80 percent or more of exposed personnel clinically ill and unable to perform their mission for 1-2 weeks. The demand on the medical and logistical systems could be overwhelming. For these reasons, SEB was one of the 7 biological agents stockpiled by the U.S. during its old bioweapons program, which was terminated in 1969.
Signs and symptoms: Exposure causes skin pain, pruritus, redness, vesicles, necrosis and sloughing of the epidermis. Effects on the airway include nose and throat pain, nasal discharge, itching and sneezing, cough, dyspnea, wheezing, chest pain and hemoptysis. Toxin also produces effects after ingestion or eye contact. Severe intoxication results in prostration, weakness, ataxia, collapse, shock, and death.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE
The potential for use as a BW toxin was demonstrated to the Russian military shortly after World War II when flour contaminated with species of Fusarium was unknowingly baked into bread that was ingested by civilians. Some developed a protracted lethal illness called alimentary toxic aleukia (ATA) characterized by initial symptoms of abdominal pain, diarrhea, vomiting, prostration, and within days fever, chills, myalgias and bone marrow depression with granulocytopenia and secondary sepsis. Survival beyond this point allowed the development of painful pharyngeal/laryngeal ulceration and diffuse bleeding into the skin (petechiae and ecchymoses), melena, bloody diarrhea, hematuria, hematemesis, epistaxis and vaginal bleeding. Pancytopenia, and gastrointestinal ulceration and erosion were secondary to the ability of these toxins to profoundly arrest bone marrow and mucosal protein synthesis and cell cycle progression through DNA replication.
Mycotoxins allegedly were released from aircraft in the "yellow rain" incidents in Laos (1975-81), Kampuchea (1979-81), and Afghanistan (1979-81). It has been estimated that there were more than 6,300 deaths in Laos, 1,000 in Kampuchea, and 3,042 in Afghanistan. The alleged victims were usually unarmed civilians or guerrilla forces. These groups were not protected with masks or chemical protective clothing and had little or no capability of destroying the attacking enemy aircraft. These attacks were alleged to have occurred in remote jungle areas, which made confirmation of attacks and recovery of agent extremely difficult. Some investigators have claimed that the “yellow clouds” were, in fact, bee feces produced by swarms of migrating insects. Much controversy has centered upon the veracity of eyewitness and victim accounts, but there is evidence to make these allegations of BW agent use in these areas possible.
Tularemia, caused by the bacteria pasteurella tularensis, which was used in Shady Grove, "is not as potent as anthrax or smallpox, but it’s not as benign as Q Fever," said Fox. For example, it is directly related to plague. "If treated early, most often people exposed to tularemia have a favorable outcome," said Fox. But, he pointed out, the Army BW program eventually discarded both tularemia and another of its cousins, brucellosis, "because it’s very easy for people handling them to come down with the disease. There’s no real vaccine or ability to protect your own people."
As for sarin, an extremely potent chemical nerve agent that is fatal in high doses, very little is needed to compromise the human nervous system. The National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine concluded that there is suggestive evidence of long-term health damage from sarin exposure, including fatigue, headache, visual disturbances, asthenia, shoulder stiffness, and symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.
The 2004 defense appropriations bill Congress sent President Bush on Thursday would close former Adm. John Poindexter's old office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and bar DARPA from proceeding with all but four small, uncontroversial parts of the admiral's Terrorism Information Awareness research program.
While it would be convenient to lay the blame solely at the feet of the U.S. government, others, including the Canadian government had a role in constructing the shroud of silence.
During World War II, the Canadian, British and U.S. governments engaged in a coordinated program of both defensive and offensive biological weapons development, even though the use of such weapons was technically prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Convention.
This wartime program was initially justified because of the suspicion that Axis powers were developing biological warfare. But the Allied victory did not bring an end to the programs. Instead, the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain cranked up their tri-national co-operation, developing offensive weapons. Canadian scientists helped produce large amounts of botulinum and anthrax spores and conducted field trials at the Suffield experimental station in Alberta. Bombs and insects were tested as means of dispersal. The full story of this tri-national collaboration has yet to be fully revealed but it seems likely that Canadian scientists were aware of the activities of Unit 731.
Guilford B. Reed and H.M. Barrett, professors at Queens and the University of Toronto respectively, also worked for Canada’s Defence Research Board that oversaw Canadian biological weapons development. In December 1947, they completed a secret report summarizing the state of knowledge related to biological warfare. It began: “With the exception of some isolated incidents in China, bacteriological warfare has not been used as weapon of war.”
In later versions of similar reports, references to China disappear. Otto Maass, head of the chemistry department of McGill and a key player in Canada’s biological warfare program, sat as a permanent Canadian representative on the U.S. biological war committee. Maass developed a close working relationship with Maj. Gen Alden Waitt, chief of the chemical corps at Fort Detrick. As it turns out, Waitt was the key figure at Fort Detrick who arranged immunity for Unit 731 officers. By early 1950, Canadian officials possessed full details of the scope of biological warfare employed in China from reports they received after Soviet trials of Unit 731 officers captured in Manchuria. The reports, which we now find were quite accurate, were dismissed at the time as Soviet propaganda. Soviet claims that biological weapons
testing at Suffield had led to an outbreak of plague among First Nations were also dismissed out of hand. Will this claim prove to be accurate? For fifty years the Canadian government has sat on what it knew about Unit 731. This was not only ethically irresponsible, it betrayed solemn obligations that the government had undertaken in the postwar settlement of World War II in Asia.
John Price is associate professor of Japanese history at the University of Victoria. He will be presenting his research at the conference “Preventing Crimes against Humanity: Lessons of the Asia-Pacific War” to be held at UBC and the University of Victoria, March 20-22.
Bikini Atoll, May 1954
HISTORY OF USS TAWAKONI ATF114 DURING OPERATION CASTLE 1954
OperationCASTLE was a six-detonation atmospheric nuclear test series. The first five detonations occured at Bikini Atoll between March 1 and May 14, 1954, while the final test took place at Eniwetok Atoll on May 14, 1954.
Tawakoni was a member of the utility task unit which was responsible for providing harbor and towing services to the joint task forse. Tawakoni also assisted USS Molala ATF 106 in providing support to the two experimental ships, USS George Eastman YAG 39 and USS Granville Hall YAG 40.
Prior to each test in which they participated, the crews of Eastman and Hall were evacuated to Molala via whaleboat.After the detonation, the two experimental ships, which were remotely controlled and equipped with special instrumentation, proceeded through the maximum fallout area.
At 6:45 a.m. on March 1, Tawakoni observed the first Castle detonation, test BRAVO, from a distance of approximately 50 miles southeast. Tawakoni was responsible for retrieving YAG-39 following test Bravo. In preparation for its retrieval, the YAG's Crew transfered fram Molala to Tawakoni that afternoon. At 5:10 p.m. the tug proceded to inspect the YAG. One hour and thirty five minutes later Tawakoni had George Eastman in tow, ant they departed for Eniwetok.
The towing line of George Eastman had been carefully laid out on the deck and the end of the towing line was suspended over the side with a special device so that the tug could take the tow line aboard without sending anyone onboard the ship.
Tawakoni with George Eastman in tow, arrived at Eniwetok on March 2. At 1:06p.mp during the return trip, a whaleboat had been lowered into the water to enable a boarding party to boardthe YAG. However , whether or not anyone actually boarded the ship is unknown. once the experimental ship was moored in Eniwetok Lagoon, Tawakoni departed to return to Bikini.
The sequence of events for test ROMEO was similar to that of BRAVO day. When ROMEO was detonated on March 27, Tawakoni was 32 miles southeast of ground zero. About three and one half hours after the 6:30 a.m. detonation, the YAG.s crew transfered from Molala to Tawakoni. At 6:12 p.m. Tawakoni proceeded on course to intercept the YAG. At 9:41 p.m., the tug made its approach. It appears that sometime later that night or the next day, George Eastmans crew reboarded their ship. on March 29, George Eastman, under its own power, was sailing toward Eniwetok in the company of Tawakoni. Both ships anchored at Eniwetok that morning.
At 6:20 a.m. on April 7, Tawakoni was 27 miles southeast of shot KOON. Approximately nine and one half hours after Koon, Tawakoni picked up passengers in Enyu Channel. At 7:28 p.m. the tug anchored in the lagoon.
The fourth Castle test, UNION, was detonated on April 26 at 6:05 a.m. Tawakoni was anchored at Eniwetok some 200 miles west of bikini. On April 30 Tawakoni was moorerd alongside YAG 39 for 40 minutes. It may have been involved in decontaminating George Eastman after the YAG's participation in UNION.
Sometime after the April 26 test and before YANKEE which was detonated May 5 at 6:10 a.m. , Tawakoni replaced USS COCOPA ATF 101 in support of the underwater pressure measurements project. The experiment required the installation and recovery of moorings and buoys and servicing of clocks and batterys in instrumented buoys.
At 6:10 a.m. on May 5, when the fifth CASTLE event, Test YANKEE occured, Tawakoni was operating 58 miles southeasdt of the detonation point. The next day the ship was underway for a decontamination project. The details of the project are unknown.
Tawakoni departed the Marshall Islands on May 8 With a district lightwer in tow. When the final Castle event , Test NECTAR, was detonated on May 14, Tawakoni was enrout to Pearl Harbor, arriving there May 18.
Tawakoni was officially released from Operation Castle on May 11. At that time the highest level of contamination recorded aboard the ship was 0.2 mr/hr.
An examination of CASTLE dosimetry data indicates that, in general, a crews overall operational exposure was based on a selected number of periiodically badged individuals. Individual film badges were to be issued when an individual was involved in an assignment that would have increased his potential for exposure. Additionally, there are instances when recorded exposure readings were assessed.
The CONSOLIDATED LIST OF CASTLE RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES is regarded as the final summation of an individual's identified cohort badges, individual badge readings and assessed doses. Based on this report, the recorded mean radiation exposure reading for the 80 listed Tawakoni crewmen is 1.26 rem gamma with a range of exposure from 0.28 to 3.180 rem gamma. These readings are within present national occupational radiation exposure standards which permit 5 rem per calendar year.
-- Keith Whittle, May 22, 1998
US Atomic Veterans
Norris J. Darbonne
Norris J. Darbonne sent email about his duty at Operation Castle.
From: firstname.lastname@example.org (Roger Darbonne)
Date: Sun, 14 May 2000
To: email@example.com (Keith)
Subject: Re: Atomic Veteran (Operation Castle)
I, Norris Darbonne was a crew member on the Yag-39. It was a Merchant Marine Ship that was converted to the Yag-39 . The yag-40 was on site also. My job was to run personnel back and forth to the harbor. I was stationed at Perry Island.
The Yag-39 was in the direct path of the fallout. When the bomb was detonated we saw the sky get really pink and the we could see the fallout. We turned away from the blast and then we felt the heat on our backs like someone ran a torch down your back. After the detonation we left the test site. Once we returned to Hunters Point we were quaranteened for three months. They ran all kinds of tests on us.
When we were chosen for the test mission we signed papers stating we had choice of duty after the tests were complete. But upon reaching Hunters Point we were told that the military changed their mind and I was sent to Korea for the Korean War.
There is a letter out that I received from the American Legion to compensate the Veterans for the Atomic Radiation. The President has appropreated money for those caught in the fallout. If you haven't received this letter I can send you a copy.
I'm sick and had prostate cancer. According to the doctors the cancer could have been caused by the radiation. According to the letter I am eligible for compensation.
May 21, 2000
Nuclear Weapons Test Film Descriptions 0800013- -Operation Castle was a six-detonation test series held at the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Pacific Proving Ground in the Spring of 1954. This test series, principally conducted at the Enewetak and Bikini Atolls in the northwestern Marshall Islands, provided proof tests of large-yield thermonuclear, or hydrogen, devices.
Castle represented the end of a drive for a workable thermonuclear weapon and the beginning of the refinement of large-H-bombs into smaller and more efficient weapons. After Castle, the U.S. could choose in a range of small tactical weapons to large strategic weapons. From this point, weapons development programs concentrated on producing bombs of specific nuclear weapons effects -- heat, blast, and radiation.
The Bravo event of the Castle series yielded 15 megatons, the most ever exploded in atmospheric testing by the U.S. A scientific miscalculation caused the yield to be about double what was expected. Also, reports indicate that Bravo was the single worst incident of fallout exposure in all of the U.S. atmospheric testing program. Fallout was scattered over more than 7,000 square miles of ocean and islands, resulting in the contamination and exposure of military, civilian U.S. personnel working on the shot, and people of the islands who were earlier moved to a supposedly "safe" island but received large amounts of radiation. Acute radiation effects were observed among some of these people.
The shots in the Castle series were:
Bravo, February 28, Bikini, 15 megatons
Romeo, March 26, Bikini, 11 megatons
Koon, April 6, Bikini, 110 kilotons
Union, April 25, Bikini, 6.9 megatons
Yankee, May 4, Bikini, 13.5 megatons
Nectar, May 13, Enewetak, 1.69 megatons
http://www.nv.doe.gov/news&pubs/photos& ... efault.htm
Las Vegas, NV 89115-2840
October 4, 2003
For Florida Armed Forces Veterans
Publication Date October 10, 2003
SHAD/112 Veterans Take Step.
HR 2433 "Health Care for Veterans of Project 112/Project SHAD Act of 2003", on a recommendation of House Veterans Affairs Committee Chairman Chris Smith, cleared the house with a voice vote and now resides in the U. S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs (SVAC). The text modifies U.S. Code, Title 38,Section 1710(e).
The bill, if it becomes law, makes a veteran who participated in a test conducted by the DoD Deseret Test Center as part of a program for chemical and biological warfare testing from 1962 through 1973 (including the program designated as Project Shipboard Hazard and Defense -SHAD- and related land-based tests)--- eligible for hospital care, medical services, and nursing home care through the Department of Veterans Affairs for any illness, notwithstanding that there is insufficient medical evidence to conclude that such illness is attributable to such testing. Eligibility terminates after December 31, 2005. (Official summary)
After the euphoria of having won World War Two passed, leaders of the country faced up to the COLD WAR. Thought was given to just how the armed forces would fare against biological, chemical and Nuclear weapons. Rightly or wrongly, top level decisions were made to subject active forces to tests and find out how well they responded. Live tests were held from 1962 through 1973. Participants in the test were not informed of the nature of their secret operations.
Uniformed services veterans involved in the tests, in later years experienced health conditions that were more severe and different than was found in non-participants.
Many filed claims with the Department of Veterans Affairs for health care and disabilities. VA asked DoD for details of the tests and health records of the sailors and soldiers. It was only after years of suffering and repeated requests that DoD has finally turned over to VA the names of participants and some other data. However, DoD claims that some of the detail VA wants is so highly classified that it can not be made available even at this late date.
Congress is trying to work around the dilemma. HR 2433 would provide health care but will do nothing for those veterans who are also disabled and unable to earn a salary to provide for them and their families.
Veterans who need help verifying their possible participation in a Project SHAD/112 test can call DoD's contact managers at 1-800-497-6261. To speak with a VA representative, call the Special Issues Helpline at 1-800-749-8387.
These SHAD/112 veterans deserve the support of all other veterans and veterans' advocates.
Since HR 2433 is now in the Senate for approval, call your two Senators using1-877-762-8762 and ask them to support survivors of Project 112/Project SHAD in this first step..
The only cosponsor of this bill from Florida is Representative Jeff Miller (REP-FL1).
Richard G. Higgins, RHig345428@aol.com. (702) 644 8586)
Dick Higgins is a long-time veterans' benefits legislation activist.
The Pentagon brass finally has found those furtive developers of weapons of mass destruction. They looked in the mirror.
The Honorable Ciro Rodriguez
San Antonio, Texas
RE: Project SHAD/112
James Bradley Stone, Project SHAD, 1969
Dear Congressman Rodriguez:
I would like to thank you on behalf of all the Project SHAD Veterans for your initiating HR 2433. It has been a long and fruitless battle for many faithful Americans thus far. We honored our commitments over the last 30 to 40 years and it is well past due for the U.S. Government to honor theirs in regard to our health and financial issues and those of our children and their children. Ultimately, the U.S. must cease and desist using Human Test Subjects for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare Research. The Bill you have brought forward is a very crucial step in that process.
Unfortunately, I found out about Project SHAD/112 the hard way in 1969. Although I had been selected for the Navy’s Nuclear Power Program, and volunteered for Submarine duty, I was side tracked to the USS Granville S. Hall, YAG-40, the Main Lab Ship for Project SHAD. I fell ill while still in the Navy and was discharged in November 1970, well short of the six years I had volunteered to serve. The cover-up, denials, and threats, however, began the minute I arrived in Pearl Harbor to report for duty on the Hall. They continue to this date.
I have suffered various symptoms of exposure to Nuclear, Chemical and Biological particles, simulants, airborne carriers, cleaning agents, radiation, as well as lead-based paint and asbestos as the Hall was in Dry Dock when I boarded the ship. There was massive disruption of all painted surfaces, wood and cloth absorbent surfaces, even to the level of sand blasting the entire exterior of the hull, removal and replacement of decking materials, major revisions to cableways, and intrusions into personnel spaces. Therefore, it is my contention that ANYONE who was stationed on the Hall at that time would have faced the same potential for exposure from all of the very dangerous and harmful substances used in testing prior to that date. This would include the ten years of Nuclear Above Ground Blasts that the Hall and sister ship, the USS George Eastman, YAG-39, were specially configured for and to which they were intimately and repeatedly exposed with essentially NO overall decontamination and insufficient tracking of radioactive particles on board immediately prior to Project SHAD.
In addition, it is VERY important to have linked the Hall & Eastman not only to Project SHAD, but also to the Smithsonian Institution’s involvement in the Pacific Biological Study Program from 1963
until 1970 and cross-contamination issues resulting from those activities. I am personally responsible for forwarding some of the documents which the Senate has utilized in revealing Project SHAD. And, it is due to the honesty, fortitude, and insistence of the Veterans involved such as myself, not the Agencies which precipitated the acts, that much of this information has come to light.
The Institute of Medicine [IOM] was tasked over a year ago to perform an extensive study of Project 112/SHAD and I was told they would contact ALL the personnel involved. To this date, there is NO evidence of their having moved forward on any front even though they have already soaked the Tax Payers for $3 Million Dollars to perform these tasks. Calling this “business as usual” is unacceptable.
While there has been some significant progress in these matters, it has been way too long in coming and many Project 112/SHAD Veterans and their survivors and descendants have paid heavily with destroyed and tortured lives at the hands of a government gone mad. While I highly doubt that proper vindication will ever ensue, the exceedingly weak efforts put forth so far are beyond laughable and have just led to more disappointment and anguish on the part of all who are affected. It is no small accomplishment on your part to have made what progress you have thus far on our account. It’s good to know there are a few decent and honest Americans left in the Federal Government.
I have enclosed herein a number of documents which should help to clarify my position and define the sort of assistance that would benefit all Project 112/SHAD Veterans:
1. The Executive Summary of the Senate’s Investigative Committee created and released pursuant to Public Law 107-314. These documents range from Unclassified to Secret classifications and I will detail my interest in them below.
2. My letter of 10-6-03 to Senator Conrad Burns [R-MT] from my home state regarding many of the same issues.
3. Secrecy Document and Letter Head from Project SHAD. [This item is curiously MISSING from my file, but I know unequivocally it existed at one time, signed upon my exiting the program in 1969. I DO have a similar document showing my participation in the Nuclear Power Program with similar wording] Please note that this document is still in effect and to my knowledge we have not been released from these agreements in any way.
4. A four-page “package” I am currently distributing to the public which includes an article I wrote for the Daily Inter Lake in Kalispell, Montana and which was published there 9-24-03; a summary of HR 2433; a letter I sent to the White House, DOD, VA and others on Veterans Day, 2002; and an excerpt from a press release regarding the Class Action Suit which Shaw-Pittman has initiated on behalf of the Vietnam Veterans of America, along with the Nuclear and Bio-Chemical Test Subjects described herein.
I would like to review the status of my plight and that of many others and would GREATLY appreciate any assistance you may provide:
A. I have filed a VA Disability Claim; number C-**********, which listed PTSD and 28 Physical Ailments. After a year of fumbling on the part of the VA, all were denied Service Connection Status with the notable exception of a 30% S.C. reference for PTSD which was obliquely tied to my participation in Project SHAD. The significance of this decision is that it is, to my knowledge, the ONLY Service Connected Disability Claim awarded thus far resulting from Project SHAD. I would like to remind you that the number of parties affected is in excess of 10,000! This was no “gift”. I had previously been awarded a 30% Service Connected status in about 1974 for “depression” as PTSD was NOT even diagnosed at that time. I would also like to point out at this juncture that the base symptoms that I developed then and have experienced for 33 years are an EXACT match to exposures from Sarin Gas. [a fact that I was unaware of until approximately a year ago] And, I would like to add that I can document my FRAUDULENT discharge from the Navy in 1970. Having acquired my personnel records and service medical records through the actions of my Senator, I have since learned that I was “DISCHARGED FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITIES” [which was hidden from me for three decades] and the VA still will not relent in that regard…? I am currently supplementing my VA Claim with the assistance of a local VVA Representative and have requested a De Novo Case Review which is theoretically proceeding at this time.
B. The DOD, VA, and others have made it virtually impossible to have these claims processed in any reasonable length of time and/or to any suitable conclusion. The vast majority of Project 112/SHAD Veterans I have communicated with cannot GET the necessary documents to proceed in any fruitful fashion.
C. The VA’s “SHAD/112 Protocol” which has been outlined is essentially “unavailable” to their own doctors and adjudicators. While they insist it doesn’t exist when you inquire about it, I have several copies which have been revised over the last two years.
D. The “SHAD Screening” which is outlined in the documents listed above is not even able to be accomplished as the VA evidently has NO doctors qualified to perform such an inspection. They have suitably pleaded ignorance in every case that I have been able to ascertain to date. This is no more than another slap in the face for people who faithfully served their country and now face even more denials in the face of concrete evidence of their needs.
E. The DIRECT connection between the USS Granville S. Hall, YAG-40 [upon which I served] and the USS George Eastman, YAG-39 and NUMEROUS very hazardous and harmful above-ground nuclear test blasts and the Smithsonian’s Bird Project is UNDENIABLE. However, the DOD, VA, Smithsonian are still complicit in hiding these facts from the participants and related parties. The cross-contamination issues are numerous and of severe medical consequence. These items have evidently been totally ignored in spite of the documentation and written testimony I supplied to Senator Max Cleland’s office and others. I was happy to see the referenced material show up in the Senate’s summary, but I have no evidence that anyone actually took note or responded to those items.
F. I am 54, unemployed, in increasingly ill health, and fighting hard to make as much progress while our narrow window of opportunity exists. My fear is that after a little “lip service” to these matters they will be swept away forever hence and I will NEVER learn what was actually done to me in the name of “National Security”. And yet, I am one of the lucky ones since I am still here to tell this tale of woe. Many have died and cannot speak for themselves.
In reference to my current set of inquiries, I will now explain the significance as I see it regarding the items listed in the Senate Summary. [document 1, enclosed]
“Vulnerability to Anti-Personnel Biological & Chemical Attack”, Secret. These two items cause two questions to arise. What is the date of the studies? How can the U.S. Government claim that there was NO danger to me and/or others since they determined this vulnerability by using myself and others as Human Test Rats? The documents listed as “Biological & Chemical Ship Penetration”, Confidential, are of particular interest to me since they have a DIRECT bearing on the activities in which I participated on the Hall.
“Vulnerability of a Naval Amphibious Task Force”, Secret, brings with it the same questions and also indicates that there were Marines or others subjected to similar unprotected circumstances as I experienced.
“Chemical Weapons in Russia, Ecology, Politics, 1994”, Unclassified, I believe to be among the items I submitted for documentation. [This item also addresses concerns about our troops currently in Iraq and other locations]
“Possible Health Hazards of the Large-Scale Release of Bacteria During the Dorset Defence Trials”, Unclassified, is also undated. Where is or was Dorset? What Bacteria? [The title is laughable on its face! “possible”…?]
Various items, Unclassified, which would assist in identifying Granville Hall personnel and others. To date, we have found perhaps 180-200 Granville Hall survivors. However it is rather distressing that we have only located a mere 10 or so from the George Eastman. This indicates to me that the rate of deaths related to SHAD exposures is much greater than the DOD/VA would have folks believe.
“NAVSEA Bibliograpy”, Unclassified, 1997. Please note the DATE of this item. How much of this activity has been exercised SINCE 1973?
“Extraterritorial Test Requirements”, Secret, causes another question to come to mind. Where were the tests done? I don’t think the Navy and others are being totally forthcoming or honest in this light. For instance, I KNOW we were performing SOME kind of Operations very near San Francisco in late 1969. I can understand why the DOD would not like this to be revealed, but it does NOTHING to further my knowledge of the substances used upon me or the Civilians in question.
“Operation Castle, Bikini Atoll”, 1954, Unclassified, is another of the items alluded to above that I forwarded to the various Committees. Please be aware that it delineates only one of DOZENS of Nuclear Blasts in which the Hall & Eastman were HEAVILY contaminated by the resulting particulate and radiation. “Operation Transit III” is a similar document and further explains how the Hall acquired a radioactive hull and severe particulate contamination.
“Project SHAD Technical Staff Training Program”, 1962, Unclassified, begs the question as to who was protected and how. Or, at the very least, makes one wonder if ANY of the “required” precautions were EVER enacted. My only “protection” was a gas mask of unknown origin and history to which NO maintenance was ever performed, nor was any explanation given except to tell me that I had to learn to don it in 10 seconds whenever a test of “harmless simulants” was underway. I was given a grand total of perhaps 5 minutes of precautionary “training” regarding this device the whole time I spent in Project SHAD, and then made to sign documents not to reveal this evidently highly classified data…!!! To say that the performance of safety practices at any time during Project SHAD was miserable would be both highly complimentary and misleading.
The various “Annual Historical Summaries” for Project Deseret, from 1962 to 1969, Confidential & Secret, are of direct consequence to the activities to those stationed on the Hall, because the various substances would be created at Fort Detrick, Maryland, sent to Deseret Test Center [otherwise referred to as Fort Douglas, Utah or Dugway Proving Grounds] and then distributed to the ships involved with DIRECT oversight from the SHAD personnel on board the Hall & Eastman and in other locations. I am particularly interested in the 1969 plans [Page 5] and review in light of my service period on the Hall. The prior items would serve to illuminate more data on potential exposures up to that date.
“Shoreline Diffusion Program”, 1969, Unclassified is of similar value since it MAY explain some of our operations in late 1969 and the possibility of exposures to Marines from Camp Pendleton or Civilians in Oceanside, California.
“USS Carbonero”, SS-337, Deck Logs, etc. are of interest because this was the only Submarine known to have participated in SHAD off of Hawaii and occasionally in the company of the Hall and Eastman at sea. I have not been able to locate any Carbonero Veterans to date, but I have had discussions with various parties who do recall the close proximity of the vessels during certain exercises very near Honolulu.
“Operational Capabilities of U.S. Forces After Biological Attack”, 1990, Unclassifed, again brings to mind my concern that these exercises continue even today and that the VA & DOD know very well what our exposures were and what to expect from them, contrary to their public position on these matters.
”Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B”, 1968, Unclassified, indicates that the DOD knew exactly what the rate of absorption of the cotton dungarees and jump suits supplied as “protective clothing” during the SHAD tests would be. I am irate at the prospect of such callous exposures to uninformed U.S. Service Personnel.
“Penetration of Enclosures”, 1969, Secret, further indicates that I was used in determining such potential dangers on the Hall.
“Strictly for the Birds”, Journal of the History of Biology, 2001 is perhaps the MOST important document I supplied to the Senate. It unequivocally indicates the DIRECT participation of Navy, Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, Scripps Oceanographic and other Civilian ships and personnel over a seven-year period concurrent with Project SHAD on the SAME islands where both Bio-Chemical Weapons and Nuclear Blast Tests were enacted. The significance of this article and a Ted Gup, Washington Post Magazine from 1985 give ample evidence that there is MUCH to be learned to the 17 cubic feet of documents currently held in a special safe at the Smithsonian. I don’t care HOW embarrassed this may make the Smithsonian if it saves even ONE life when the truth is revealed. Furthermore, that life may very well be mine.
“Entomological Warfare”, Secret. This item MAY delineate tests performed on the George Eastman at Baker Island during SHAD or at other locations such as Deseret Test Center or Dugway involving mosquitoes and/or lice, etc. It may shed some light on the Pacific Bird Project or other matters. I do know that the Smithsonian Project was designed in part to explore the use of migratory sea birds as “avian vectors” and tens of thousands of birds were shot from the deck of the Hall during the tests as well as more than two million birds being banded by unprotected and uninformed Sailors. The carcasses were routinely dissected on the Hall by untrained crewmen resulting in God only knows WHAT exposures in the process.
“U.S. Army Activity”, 1977, Unclassified and Secret, also may have a direct bearing on the Hall’s activity as it was actually an ARMY ship with both Navy and Civilian Personnel on board during SHAD.
“U.S. Biological Warfare Agent Testing Using HUMAN SUBJECTS”, Unclassified, may be of use or it may be a “white paper” style cover up. I do know that DARPA had a meeting approximately one year ago addressing “best human test subject practices” and Project SHAD in particular. If you could determine what THAT meeting entailed, it may be of CRUCIAL interest to all SHAD Veterans, including myself.
Finally, the Muster Rolls and other personnel listings in the remainder of the list would be a GREAT help in locating our former Shipmates and Comrades in Arms. The DOD, VA, and National Archives have made every effort to delay or deny our communicating with each other. Having those personnel lists would go a long way in double-checking the number of personnel involved and perhaps allowing some reunions of some parties that have been mistreated and abandoned by their own government.
Thank you for your Kind Consideration, Sir!
Disclosure of Information on Project 112
This report is submitted pursuant to section 709(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-314 and documents completion of Department of Defense activities contemplated by the investigation plan submitted pursuant to sections 709(a) and (b) of the same law. This law called for submission by the Department of Defense (DoD) to Congress and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (VA) of a comprehensive plan for the review, declassification, and submittal to VA of all DoD information on Project 112 relevant to the provision of VA benefits to Project 112 participants, and then for a six-month progress report and final report upon completion of all activities contemplated by the comprehensive plan. The statute defines Project 112 as the chemical and biological weapons vulnerability testing program conducted by the Deseret Test Center from 1963 to 1969, including the Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) project.
In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara launched a wide-ranging assessment of how the Department of Defense (DoD) was organized and how the armed forces were structured and equipped to secure the nation. Of the approximately 150 sequentially numbered intensive studies undertaken, the 112th addressed chemical and biological warfare capabilities and defense.
Project 112 began during the early Cold War era when the United States faced a nuclear threat from both the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union was also suspected of having active chemical and biological warfare development programs. The United States considered chemical and biological warfare as an alternative to nuclear war. However, knowledge of nerve agent behavior in the field and operational decontamination in varying climates and terrain was limited. Despite extensive experimentation by the British and Japanese during Word War II, reliable biological agent weaponization had not been achieved. The effects of biological weapons in varying climates and terrain were also largely unexplored. Because DoD's knowledge of chemical and biological warfare agent behavior was so limited, a testing program was begun.
The U.S. Army was directed to establish a test center that would be staffed and funded by all the Services and would coordinate a joint test program. The Army established the Deseret Test Center at Fort Douglas, Utah, in June 1962. That location allowed test center personnel to take advantage of facilities and personnel at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to support tests, which were expected to be conducted in the Pacific Ocean or on land in Alaska, Hawaii and the then-Panama Canal Zone. From 1962 to 1973, the Deseret Test Center conducted a series of operational chemical and biological warfare tests in support of Project 112. Project SHAD (Shipboard Hazard and Defense) was a subset of that program. Much of the chemical and biological warfare agent behavior information collected then remains valid today.
The Deseret Test Center's testing objectives and priorities were established at a series of more-or-less annual joint planning conferences attended by representatives of the Services and Joint and Combatant Commands. The Center's biological testing program was significantly curtailed after President Nixon's November 25, 1969, renunciation of biological weapons and limitation of research to "techniques of immunization and measures of controlling and preventing the spread of disease." A week earlier, passage and signature of Public Law 91-121 had inserted the then-Department of Health, Education and Welfare into the approval process for all open-air tests involving actual chemical or biological agents. A year later, the Clean Air Act of 1970 formally established guidelines on the release of substances into the air. By mid-1971, the Deseret Test Center's funding had been severely curtailed and it closed in 1973.
Beginning in late 1991 and continuing for approximately five years, the Department of the Army, as DoD executive agent for chemical and biological matters, received and responded to several Congressional inquiries on behalf of three possible Project SHAD veterans. In 1992, the Army confirmed the existence of the Project SHAD program and provided, in relation to these specific inquiries, vessels involved, test locations and substances used. In a 1994 response, unclassified or redacted documents were also provided. In 1997 and 1998, there was renewed Congressional, Department of Veterans Affairs and media interest in release of additional information on the testing program. In August 2000, VA Acting Secretary Gober asked DoD to provide information concerning the Project SHAD tests. At the time of the request, information on three tests - Autumn Gold, Copper Head and Shady Grove - was needed to satisfy pending claims, but additional Project SHAD tests were believed to have occurred.
In September 2000, responsibility for the investigation was assigned to the organization now known as the Deployment Health Support Directorate (DHSD). Weekly meetings between the DoD investigative team leader and VA's compensation and health benefits managers ensured that the DoD team was searching for the specific information that the VA needed. That information included the dates and locations of the tests, the vessels involved, lists of the chemical and biological agents, simulants, tracer materials and decontaminants documented to have been used in the tests and rosters of the personnel aboard the vessels.
Investigators received some initial documentation from the Dugway Proving Ground technical library and, once the investigation expanded beyond the first three tests, searched for more in the archives of the Dahlgren Naval Surface Warfare Center. The first major hurdle was the discovery that 'SHAD,' while a valid umbrella term, was not commonly used at the time of the testing and thus was not a helpful search term. Investigators had to identify individual test names and numbers and use those as search criteria. Even with that information, document searches proved to be more difficult than expected because some of the tests had more than one name and/or test number.
When the investigation was expanded beyond the first three tests, DoD decided veterans of individual tests should not have to wait for a full report of the investigation. Investigators were instructed to prepare fact sheets for delivery to the VA and publication as soon as they had compiled and declassified the necessary information. The Autumn Gold, Copper Head and Shady Grove fact sheets were provided to the VA on September 13, 2001, and posted to the DHSD Web site, DeploymentLINK, to inform the public. The Autumn Gold and Copper Head tests both used biological simulants; Shady Grove used biological warfare agents.
In a joint DoD/VA press conference on January 31, 2002, the Eager Belle I and II and Scarlet Sage fact sheets were released and were posted to the DHSD Web site to inform the public. Biological simulants were used in all three tests.
The Flower Drum I and II, Fearless Johnny, Purple Sage, DTC Test 68-50, and DTC Test 69-32 fact sheets were released on May 23, 2002. The fact sheets were posted to the DHSD Web site to inform the public. The Flower Drum series and Fearless Johnny used chemical warfare nerve agents. Purple Sage was a chemical simulant test. DTC Test 68-50 used biological warfare agent and DTC Test 69-32 used biological simulants.
By this point, the investigation indicated that both shipboard and land-based testing were planned by the Deseret Test Center. The DoD committed to obtaining and providing to VA all medically relevant information and names of servicemembers present during all tests known to have been planned and conducted by the Deseret Test Center from 1962-1973. Document searches had already expanded to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and several sites in the Washington, D.C., area. Investigators developed an understanding of the role the Deseret Test Center played in the planning and execution of the tests. A major breakthrough came with the discovery of several Deseret semi-annual and annual progress reports, which allowed a better understanding of the universe of tests being investigated.
In July 2002, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs William Winkenwerder Jr., MD formed a task force committed to completing the search for documents and providing all medically relevant information to the VA by June 2003. To allow public oversight of the team's progress, a chart showing the current status of the investigation was posted to the DeploymentLINK Web site and continually updated. In late August 2002, the investigative team traveled to Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, where they located additional final test reports. The team also secured a complete set of annual planning conference reports, searched and retrieved relevant documents from paper archives, initiated actions to have fragile classified films copied to a more stabile media, and interviewed several former Deseret Test Center scientists.
In October 2002, DoD published 33 fact sheets based on newly discovered material from the Dugway, Utah, trip. Personnel information was provided to the VA in advance of a series of activities to communicate with Congress and the public. Publication of the fact sheets and posting the information to the DeploymentLINK Web Site followed a series of briefings to members of Congress and state delegations, Congressional testimony, and a joint DoD/VA press briefing. Fact sheets published included: Whistle Down, Night Train, Tall Timber, West Side I, Magic Sword, Big Tom, Sun Down, Devil Hole I, High Low, Elk Hunt I, Elk Hunt II, Pine Ridge, Devil Hole II, Swamp Oak I, Green Mist, West Side II, Half Note, Dew Point, Red Cloud, Watch Dog, Rapid Tan, DTC Test 68-53, DTC Test 69-10, DTC Test 69-12, DTC Test 69-14, DTC Test 69-31, DTC Test 69-75, DTC Test 70-73, Big Jack A, Big Jack B, Yellow Leaf, Red Oak I and Pin Point. Of the 33 fact sheets, 16 detailed the use of simulants and 17 detailed the use of live chemical or biological agents in the tests.
In December 2002, DoD released one additional fact sheet, Cliff Rose, and corrected a previously released fact sheet, High Low, based on information provided by several veterans. The information was provided to the VA and posted to the Web Site, DeploymentLINK, to inform the public. The investigative team intensified its search into obscure references to determine the status of the remaining tests.
Final declassification of medically relevant information on eight tests in June 2003 completed the public release of information on all known planned Deseret Test Center chemical and biological operational tests from 1962 to 1973. Fact sheets for three shipboard tests included Errand Boy, Folded Arrow and DTC Test 70-C. Seven fact sheets for five land-based tests included Blue Tango, DTC Test 70-11 Phase I subtest 3, DTC Test 70-11 Phase I subtest 4, DTC Test 70-74, DTC Test 73-30, DTC Test 74-10 Phase I and DTC Test 74-10 Phase II. The fact sheets were provided to the VA and posted to the Web site. Two of the shipboard tests - Errand Boy and Folded Arrow, used biological warfare agent simulants; one test - DTC Test 70-C - monitored naturally occurring airborne particulates in a marine atmosphere to gather background data. Of the five land-based tests, two used nerve agent simulants and three used biological simulants. The team also provided updated information on two tests; Big Tom and Half Note, based on recently located information and provided detailed analyses to explain why 20 tests were presumed to have been canceled.
Table 1. Released Fact Sheets
September 13, 2001
January 31, 2002
May 23, 2002
October 9, 2002
October 31, 2002
December 31, 2002
June 30, 2003
The rosters of personnel aboard participating vessels were extracted from the ships' muster rolls and deck logs archived at National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. Lists of military personnel who participated in land-based tests have been assembled from available test officers' logbooks, temporary duty orders, country clearance messages, overtime reports, letters of commendation, and similar documents.
Personnel rosters for tests Autumn Gold, Copperhead and Shady Grove were provided to the VA beginning in March 2001. By release of the October 2002 fact sheets, personnel rosters were being passed prior to fact sheet publication to facilitate the VA's address acquisition process. Over 8800 records have been passed to the VA, documenting the participation of 5,842 individuals in one or more of the 50 tests.
Table 2. Summary of Personnel Information Flow to the VA
No. of Records
March 2001 1535
July 2001 288
January 2002 1549
February 2002 11
May 2002 836
June 2002 126
July 2002 457
September 2002 891
October 2002 18
December 2002 433
January 2003 1275
February 2003 1
April 2003 7
June 2003 1415
No military personnel data were located for the following land-based tests: Whistle Down, Big Jack A, Big Jack B, Night Train, Sun Down, Devil Hole I, Swamp Oak I, West Side II, Pin Point, Dew Point, Red Cloud, Watch Dog, Rapid Tan, Cliff Rose, DTC Test 68-53, DTC Test 69-12, DTC Test 69-14, DTC Test 69-75, DTC Test 70-11, DTC Test 70-73, DTC Test 70-74 and DTC Test 74-10. No personnel data were reported to the VA for the shipboard test Flower Drum II because the target vessel was unmanned. No personnel data were reported to the VA for the shipboard test DTC Test 70-C because this test only collected air samples of naturally occurring airborne particulates while traveling from San Diego to Panama. No agents or simulants were released.
The purpose of this investigation was to locate information concerning possible exposures to military personnel. During the course of its work, the investigative team did locate documentation substantiating the participation of approximately 350 government civilian employees and contractor personnel.
In its search for medically relevant information, the investigative team has contacted and/or visited every command and government research activity known to have been affiliated with the Deseret Test Center. In general, the type of records found were technical reports on tests plans and results. Such reports were and are classified for national security reasons because information on dissemination characteristics of, and operational countermeasures to, chemical and biological agents and simulants for those agents could be used by adversaries or terrorist organizations with chemical or biological weapons program ambitions. However, without compromising national security information, the identification of agents or simulants, tracers and decontaminants used in tests can be declassified and released in fact sheets to answer questions about veterans' exposures under Project 112. Fact sheets have been published, which meet the VA's criteria for the information needed to evaluate compensation claims and health care needs. The DHSD will continue to cooperate with the VA should additional information be needed for the purposes of detailed epidemiological studies. Although we have conducted an exhaustive search for information pertinent to possible VA benefits for Project 112 veterans, we cannot agree that any degree of searching records archives of a long ago terminated program would result in complete current documentation of all aspects of the program. Nonetheless, we believe the evidence found produces an accurate total picture of the Deseret Test Center program. We know of no other investigative leads that would meaningfully supplement that picture. However, the DHSD will investigate any new information that may be presented and share any additional or changed information with the VA and the public.
In DoD's investigation, no test-specific medical records or classified medical records were found. Technical reports on tests did not include personally identifiable information on health effects of exposures. The purpose of the tests was not to measure health effects; the purpose was to assess dissemination characteristics and operational countermeasures. Confirming reports from some veterans that in some tests nasal swabs and gargle samples were taken, one test report records results from nasal swab and gargle samples of several individuals, but these results did not include personal identifiers that would tie the results to specific individuals or produce information for medical records. These samples taken from individuals were to test the comparative filtering effects of different types of gas masks. In relation to other tests, several references to possible health surveillance activities and protective measures were also found in technical reports of test plans or results, matters presumably documented, to the extent they actually occurred, in members' individual medical records. We found an indication that in the 11-year history of the Deseret Test Center program there were four infections and no deaths. We found no other information connecting this notation, which might involve Deseret Test Center laboratory workers, to any particular Project 112 test or tests. We found no personally identifiable information on illnesses or medical treatments.
Review of the operational test planning documents and final test report documents and discussions with several of the scientists who planned and conducted these tests have provided substantiation that whenever harmful chemical or biological warfare agents were used as test substances, personnel present were appropriately protected. Actual exposure to such agents would result in acute health effects. However, when chemical or biological simulants or tracer materials were used, there were no efforts made to protect personnel because those substances were not believed to be harmful. For the shipboard operational testing, we have reviewed the ships' deck logs and have not found any indication of acute medical problems (deaths, medical evacuations, or numerous crewmembers becoming ill) at the time of this testing or immediately afterwards. This is also the case for those land-based tests for which we have located test officers' logs. In addition, neither the final test reports nor the Deseret Test Center scientists we talked with indicated any acute medical problems arising from participation in the series of tests we reviewed. Many of the chemical simulants that were used by the Deseret Test Center continue to be used as chemical simulants today. Only one of the biological simulants - Bacillus subtillis var. niger (Bacillus globigii) - continues to be used as a biological simulant for operational testing today. The other biological simulants have been replaced with agents having a lower risk of causing acute infections in immuno-compromised individuals. The decontaminants used were recognized to have acute effects on people if proper precautions were not taken; however, these substances are still being used today.
The Institute of Medicine, Medical Follow-up Agency, has been contracted to conduct a study of the current health of those sailors who were present during Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) testing and to compare their health status with sailors of the same period who were on similar ships which did not participate in operational chemical and biological testing. The results of this study should be concluded in 2005.
Although the information available does not suggest a pattern of illness or disability attributable to Project 112/SHAD participation, DoD believes the information that has been found, declassified, and released will greatly assist both further assessment of the entire project, such as the IOM study, and further analysis of individual veteran's disability claims. For thousands of veterans, the VA will now be able to confirm participation in SHAD and make a determination about exposure to a particular substance of substances. If scientific evidence supports a cause and effect link between such exposure and a disabling illness, the elements needed for a disability compensation award or other veterans' benefits will all be established.
The DHSD hears from Project 112 veterans almost daily. Many of those veterans have sent copies of documents that have helped the investigation. Every veteran's account has been heard and factored into the investigation. Their recollections and personal documents have been very helpful in filling in the gaps in the official record.
A Commendation to Project 112 Veterans
The Department of Defense wishes to acknowledge the patriotic service of all who participated in the Project 112 program. Publication of this report summarizes a significant effort on the part of many people in the Department of Defense to ensure important information has been made available to service members and the Department of Veterans Affairs. DoD understands that some Project 112/SHAD veterans feel this investigation should have been conducted and the information provided years ago, and hopes that the efforts summarized in this report are responsive to their concerns. This in-depth investigation reflects an individual and collective commitment to veterans and their families to help bring closure and to replace speculation and uncertainty with fact.
What We Know Today
The Deseret Test Center planned 134 operational tests in support of Project 112. Fifty were conducted and 84 canceled. Table 3 shows the distribution of land- and sea-based (SHAD) tests.
Table 3. Distribution of Project 112 tests
Planned 134 90 44
Conducted 50 31 19
Canceled 84 59 25
Approximately half of the Project SHAD tests were conducted in the open ocean. The remaining tests were conducted in the coastal waters of California, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Marshall Islands. Table 4 shows the locations of the 19 completed Project SHAD tests.
Table 4. Location of Project SHAD Tests
Atlantic Ocean 1
Vieques, Puerto Rico 1
Pacific Ocean 13
Off Hawaiian Islands
Off San Diego
Oahu, Hawaii 3
Marshall Islands 1
Approximately two-thirds of the Project 112 land-based tests were conducted outside the continental United States. Half of those were conducted in Alaska because the test sites could be used under both temperate and arctic conditions. Most of those conducted in the continental United States were conducted at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. Table 5 shows the primary locations of the 31 completed land-based tests; some tests conducted a portion of their trials at other listed test sites.
Table 5. Primary location of Project 112 land-based tests
Canada and Great Britain 1
Test documentation lists 21 Navy and Army vessels as participating in one or more Project SHAD tests. These vessels are listed in Table 6.
Table 6. Participating vessels
USNS Silas Bent
USS George Eastman
USS Granville S. Hall
USNS Samuel Phillips Lee
USS Fort Snelling
USS Herbert J. Thomas
USS Tioga County
USS Wexford County
The fact sheets for each test identify the substances used in that particular test. Summarized below are the substances documented to have been used in one or more of the Project 112 tests along, with their known health effects.
Tabun (GA). Tabun is an amber, non-persistent liquid, which gives off little odor when vaporizing. The vapor is colorless. When exposed to Tabun, the first symptoms a victim will experience are a runny nose, tightness in the chest and dilation of the pupils. The victim will then encounter difficulty breathing, drooling from the mouth and nausea. Ultimately the victim will become comatose and will suffocate as a consequence of convulsive spasms. Tabun is essentially absorbed through the skin; however, vapors can also be hazardous. If a person does not receive an immediate lethal dose, death will occur after approximately 20 minutes. Those receiving a less than lethal dose who do not receive immediate medical care may suffer permanent neurological damage. There is little information available regarding the long-term human health effects of exposure to low does of tabun. [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at http://www.cbw.sipri.se/docu/cw-agents/tabun.html]
Sarin (GB). Sarin is a volatile and lethal nerve agent. It can enter the body by inhalation, ingestion, through the eyes, and to a lesser extent through the skin. After exposure to a sufficient dose, symptoms may occur within minutes and include runny nose, watery eyes, difficulty breathing, dimness of vision, confusion, drowsiness, coma, and death. Very little information is available regarding long-term health effects following exposures to low levels that do not cause acute symptoms. An Institute of Medicine Committee concluded that there was insufficient evidence for or against an association between low-level sarin exposure and long-term health effects. [Centers for Disease Control at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Nerve/Sarin/Sarin.asp]
Soman (GD). Soman is a colorless liquid, which gives off an odor of rotting fruit when vaporizing. The vapor is colorless. Soman is a persistent agent that can easily remain in a particular area for a day or longer, depending on the atmospheric conditions. Symptoms associated with exposure to Soman include a runny nose, tightness in the chest and constriction of the pupils. These symptoms are followed by difficulty in breathing. Ultimately the victim will become comatose and suffocate as a consequence of convulsive spasms. There is little information available regarding the long-term human health effects of exposure to soman. [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at http://www.cbw.sipri.se/docu/cw-agents/soman.html]
VX. VX nerve agent is extremely lethal. It is an oily liquid that is clear, odorless, and tasteless. Death usually occurs within 10-15 minutes after absorption of a fatal dosage. VX nerve agent is one of the most toxic substances ever synthesized. Symptoms of overexposure may occur within minutes or hours, depending upon the dose. They include: constriction of pupils, headaches, runny nose, salivation, tightness in the chest, nausea, vomiting, anxiety, difficulty in thinking, muscle twitches, tremors, and weakness. With severe exposure, symptoms progress to convulsions and respiratory failure. There is little information available regarding the long-term human health effects of low doses of VX. [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Nerve/VX/ctc0006.asp or World Health Organization, Department of Sustainable Development & Environmental Protection http://22.214.171.124/phe/factsheet5.htm]
Ester of Benzilic Acid (Agent BZ) (3-quinuclidinic ester of benzilic acid). Agent BZ is a psychochemical compound designed for temporarily disabling an enemy. It is designed to cause stupor, confusion and hallucinations when inhaled or absorbed through the skin. It is a white powder and may cause eye and skin irritation. Agent BZ may also irritate the digestive and respiratory tracts, if inhaled or ingested. While some effects may last several days or weeks, long-term or late-developing health effects have not been documented and seem unlikely. [http://www.fishersci.ca/msds.nsf or http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cb ... 94001.html]
Coxiella burnetii (OU). This microorganism (a rickettsial species) can cause acute and chronic infection of the lung, liver, heart valve, nervous system, and other body sites (Q fever). Complications from this infection may be serious, even life threatening, but late-developing health effects would be unlikely. [Chin J, ed., Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, American Public Health Association, Washington DC, 2000, p. 407-11; Marrie, Thomas J., in Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases, 5th edition (vol. 2), Churchill Livingstone, Philadelphia, 2000, p. 2043-50]
Francisella tularensis (TT and ZZ). Formerly identified as Pasteurella tularensis, this bacterial species can cause acute infection of the lung, bloodstream, and other body sites (tularemia), and is considered a potential biological warfare agent. While complications of the acute infection may be serious, even life threatening, long-term or late-developing health effects would be very unlikely. [Cross, J et al., in Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases, 5th edition (vol. 2), Mandell GL, Bennett JE, Dolin R, eds., Churchill Livingstone, Philadelphia, 2000, p. 2393-2402; and Dennis DT et al., JAMA 2001;285(21):2763-73]
Puccinia graminis tritici (TX). This fungal species is toxic to plants, and therefore was considered a potential biological warfare agent directed against agricultural crops. It is not ordinarily considered to have either short-term or long-term human health effects. [Zajtchuk R., ed., Textbook of Military Medicine (part 1, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1997), Office of the Army Surgeon General, Washington DC, 1997, p. 60, 460; and web site at http://www.cbwinfo.com]
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (PG2). When inhaled, this bacterial toxin can cause fever and cough, incapacitation, and (with large doses) death, and is considered a potential biological warfare agent. When ingested, it commonly causes gastrointestinal symptoms (nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea). Some symptoms may last weeks, but long-term or late-developing health effects would be unlikely. [Ulrich RG et al., in Textbook of Military Medicine (part 1, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1997), Office of the Army Surgeon General, Washington DC, 1997, p. 621-30]
Riot Control Agents:
CS and CS2. Two of several chemicals commonly called "Tear Gas." CS and CS2 are white, crystalline powders dispersed into the air as either an aerosol or powder. The chemical name for CS and CS2 is ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile. Riot control agents affect the eyes, airways and skin. Exposure to CS causes burning, irritation, tearing and pain in the eyes. Airway symptoms include burning, sneezing, cough, shortness of breath and increased secretions, such as runny nose and increased salivation. High concentrations of CS or CS2 can cause blistering of the skin. With commonly used concentrations, these effects are short-term and the potential for long-term health consequences is low. [http://www.metrokc.gov/health/hazard/riotcontrol.htm#cs and Cornell University, http://msds.pdc.cornell.edu/msds/siri/f ... chlfz.html ]
Bis (2-ethyl-hexyl) hydrogen phosphite. This chemical compound used as an additive in industrial lubricants can cause acute irritation of the skin, eyes, and respiratory tract. There is insufficient evidence for or against long-term health effects. [NLM TOXNET at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov.]
Di (2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP). This chemical is commonly present in flexible plastics and therefore widespread in the environment and of some concern for the general population. While low level exposures have not been shown to cause serious health effects, acute exposure to high levels of this chemical can cause irritation of the skin, eyes, and respiratory tract. DEHP has caused cancer in some animal testing, but the relevance of this testing to cancer in humans is uncertain. [DHHS PHS ATSDR ToxFAQs, Di(2- ethylhexyl)phthalate #117-81-7, April 1993, and Toxicological Profile for Di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP), September 2000, both available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov. Also WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (vol. 77, Some Industrial Chemicals updated February 23, 2000), and NLM TOXNET, Bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate 117-81-7 Human Health Effects, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Diethyl phthalate. This chemical is commonly present in flexible plastics and cosmetics as well as in some insecticides and repellents, and therefore widespread in the environment and of some concern for the general population. While low level exposures have not been shown to cause serious human health effects, acute exposure to high levels of this chemical can cause irritation of the skin and eyes in animal testing. It is mutagenic and carcinogenic in some cell and animal testing, but these effects have not been demonstrated in humans. [DHHS PHS ATSDR ToxFAQs, Diethyl Phthalate #84-66-2, September 1996, and Toxicological Profile for Diethyl Phthalate, both available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov. Also NLM TOXNET, Diethyl Phthalate 84-66-2, HSDB Human Health Effects and Animal Toxicity Studies, as well as CCRIS, IRIS and other databases, all available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP). Dimethylmethylphosphonate is used as a flame retardant, a pre-ignition additive for gasoline, an antifoam agent, a plasticizer and stabilizer, a textile conditioner and anti-static agent, and an additive for solvents and low-temperature hydraulic fluids. It may be harmful if inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin. It is a suspected carcinogen. [http://ntp-server.niehs.nih.gov/htdocs/LT-studies/tr323.html]
Polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA). Polymethyl methacrylate is a clear plastic used as a shatterproof replacement for glass. It is also found in acrylic latex paints. Little is known about long-term health effects of PMMA, but methyl methacrylate (from which PMMA is made) is considered not likely to be carcinogenic to humans. [EPA, Toxicological review of methyl methacrylate (CAS No. 80-62-6), January 1998, available at http://www.epa.gov, and NLM TOXNET, methyl methracrylate, HSDB Human Health Effects, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Methylacetoacetate (MAA). While acute exposure to this compound has been associated with irritation of skin, eyes, respiratory tract, and digestive tract, there is little or no evidence of long-term or late-developing health effects and it is not known to cause cancer in animal testing. [NLM TOXNET, Methyl acetoacetate 105-45-3, HSDB Human Health Effects and Animal Toxicity Studies, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2). This compound is a common product of combustion and an environmental air pollutant. Acute exposure to high levels of sulfur dioxide can cause burning of the nose and throat, difficulty breathing, and even obstruction of the airways. Long-term exposures have been associated with breathing difficulty and lung damage. Even low level exposures may worsen asthma. It can cause cancer in some animal species, but this has not been clearly demonstrated in humans. [DHHS PHS ATSDR ToxFAQs, Sulfur dioxide #7446-09-5, June 1999, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov]
Trichloropropane. This chemical is used as an industrial solvent, paint and varnish remover, and cleaning and degreasing agent. Exposure to high levels for a short time causes eye and throat irritation. [http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts57.html http://www.osha-slc.gov/fts/chemicalsma ... 73200.html]
Trioctyl phosphate (TOF). Used as a simulant for VX nerve agent. This compound, also known as tri(2-ethylhexyl) phosphate, can irritate the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract on contact. It can cause cancer in some animal species, but this has not been demonstrated in humans. [NLM TOXNET, Trioctyl phosphate 1806-54-8 or Tris(2-ethylhexyl)phosphate 78-42-2, HSDB Human Health Effects and Animal Toxicity Studies, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Bacillus globigii (BG). Now considered to be a variety or close relative of Bacillus subtilis, this bacterial species was used as a simulant and considered harmless to healthy individuals. Bacillus subtilis and similar Bacillus species are common in the environment, and are uncommon causes of disease. They have been associated with acute infections of the ear, meninges (brain lining), urinary tract, lung, heart valve, bloodstream, and other body sites, but always or nearly always in individuals whose health has already been compromised. Long-term or late developing health effects would be very unlikely. [Tuazon CU in Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases, 5th edition (vol. 2), ed., Mandell GL, Bennett JE, Dolin R, Churchill Livingstone, Philadelphia, 2000, p. 2220-6, and US Environmental Protection Agency, Bacillus subtilis Final Risk Assessment, February 1997, available at http://www.epa.gov]
Escherichia coli (E. coli). This bacterial species is a common inhabitant of the digestive tract but can also cause acute infection, especially when it gains access to other body sites, like the urinary tract, lung, and bloodstream. Long-term or late-developing health effects of E. coli infection would be unlikely. [Eisenstein, Barry I.et al, in Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases, 5th edition (vol. 2), Churchill Livingstone, Philadelphia, 2000, p. 2299-301.]
Serratia marcescens (SM). This bacterial species can cause acute infections of the urinary tract, lung, bloodstream, and other body sites. These infections commonly occur in individuals whose health has already been compromised, and often in patients who are already hospitalized. Long-term or late-developing health effects would be very unlikely. Its use as a bacterial marker for studying the dissemination of bacterial aerosols was discontinued in 1969. [Eisenstein, BI et al., in Principles and Practice of Infectious Diseases (chap. 206), 2000]
T-3 coliphage. Coliphages are viruses (bacteriophages) that infect E. coli bacteria and would not be expected to have harmful effects on humans. [http://www.epa.gov/nerlcwww/1601ap01.pdf]
Calcofluor (fluorescent brightener 28). Used as a fluorescent tracer with Bacillus globigii. This chemical has been used as a medical laboratory stain and as a whitening agent in detergents. It can cause eye irritation in animal testing, but there is limited evidence for or against human health effects. [NLM TOXNET, Cellufluor 4193-55-9, available at net.nlm.nih.gov, and MSDS available at http://hazard.com]
Phosphorous 32. One of the highest-energy beta-emitting radionucleotides commonly used in biomedical research. In general Phosphorous 32 does not pose a severe threat from ingestion or inhalation. High-energy betas from Phosphorous 32 pose an external (skin and lens of the eye) dose hazard as well as a potential internal hazard. Radiogenic health effects (primarily cancer) are observed in humans only in doses in excess of 10 rem delivered at high dose rates. Below this dose, estimation of adverse health effects is speculative. Exposure can contribute to development of cancer. [http://www.uos.harvard.edu/ehs/radsafety/gui_p32.shtml]
Tiara. A luminescent gelatinous material. No other information is available.
Uranine. This chemical compound is added to cosmetics for color and is commonly used (injected or applied) for medical diagnostic purposes (e.g., for vascular imaging and eye staining). It can cause acute skin reactions and acute allergic reactions (including life-threatening anaphylaxis) in some individuals. Long-term and late-developing health effects would be very unlikely. [NLM TOXNET, Fluorescein Sodium 518-47-8 and Fluorescein 2321-07-5, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Zinc cadmium sulfide (ZCdS). This compound was aerosolized as a tracer material for the dispersion of biological warfare agents because it had similar properties. There has been little scientific study on the toxicity of this compound when inhaled. A National Research Council (NRC) committee focused on the cadmium component as potentially most toxic. While higher concentrations and more prolonged exposures to cadmium are associated with the development of lung cancer, the concentrations and duration of exposure in the Army's tests were substantially lower. The NRC committee concluded that the risk of adverse health effects to populations in the area was low. [National Research Council (National Academies), Toxicologic Assessment of the Army's Zinc Cadmium Sulfide Dispersion]
Betapropiolactone (b-Propiolactone). This chemical is a disinfectant. Modern uses for b-propiolactone include vaccines, enzymes, tissue grafts, and surgical instruments; to sterilize blood plasma, water, milk, and nutrient broth; and as a vapor-phase disinfectant in enclosed spaces. Its sporicidal action kills vegetative bacteria, pathogenic fungi, and viruses. The primary routes of potential human exposure to b-propiolactone are inhalation, ingestion, and dermal contact. Acute contact can cause skin, eye, and respiratory tract irritation, sometimes with permanent damage. An International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) working group reported no data are available to evaluate the carcinogenicity of b-propiolactone in humans. It is carcinogenic and mutagenic in animal and bacterial cell testing. [Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health web site at http-server.niehs.nih.gov; EPA Technology Transfer network Air Toxics Website, at http://epa.gov, and NLM TOXNET, at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov]
Calcium hypochlorite. Uses for calcium hypochlorite include bleach, cleaning solutions, and disinfectants for drinking water, wastewater purification systems, and swimming pools. When released into the air, it is broken down by sunlight and compounds commonly found in the air. Ingestion of small amounts can cause gastrointestinal irritation. Larger amounts can cause corrosive injuries to the mouth, throat, esophagus, and stomach and can be life threatening. Inhalation of chlorine gas may cause nasal irritation, sore throat, and coughing. Contact with the skin may cause burning pain, inflammation, and blisters. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has determined that hypochlorite salts are not classifiable as to their carcinogenicity in humans. [ATSDR Medical management guidelines for calcium hypochlorite and sodium hypochlorite, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov]
Monoethanolamine. This chemical causes eye and skin burns, may be harmful or fatal if swallowed, may cause dizziness and drowsiness, and causes respiratory tract irritation and possibly damage. Chronic exposure to skin may cause a persistent irritation or dermatitis. Repeated inhalation may cause lung damage. [http://www.astrochemicals.com/10129.pdf]
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. Aedes aegypti mosquitoes used in this test were not infected. Health effects at the time would be the usual swelling and irritation associated with mosquito bites. No long-term or latent effects would be expected.
http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/current_i ... sclose.htm
SHAD SUMMARY REPORT
Autumn Gold May 1963
APA-215 USS Navarro 393
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 112
DD-825 USS Carpenter 268
DDG-13 USS Hoel 399
MARINE AIR GROUP 13 Marine AR Group 13 189
LST-1158 USS Tioga County 175
Big Tom May - June 1965
SS 337 USS Carbonero 119
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 117
Blue Tango Jan - Feb 1967
DPG N/A 30
Copper Head 24 January - 25 February, 1965
DD-839 USS Power 289
Devil Hole I Jul - Sep 1965
Land Base Land Base 151
Devil Hole II Jul - Sep 1966
Land Base Land Base 16
DTC Programs 202.205 20 Feb - 20 May 1967
DPG N/A 3
DTCTEST 68-50 September, October, 1968
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 127
DTCTEST 69-10 May 69
LSD-30 USS Fort Snelling 786
DTCTEST 69-31 August - September, 1968
DD-833 USS Thomas 313
DTCTEST 69-32 30 April - 28 June, 1969
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 150
Eager Bell II February, March, June, 1963
DD-825 USS Carpenter 261
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 120
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 125
LST-1158 USS Tioga County 176
APA-215 USS Navarro 394
Eager Belle I January, March , 1963
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 119
Elk Hunt 1 Jul - Aug 1964
DPG N/A 6
Elk Hunt, Phase I & II Jun - Aug 1964
Land Base Land Base 111
Errand Boy September 6 - 13, 1963
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 95
Fearless Johnny August - September, 1965
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 128
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 133
Flower Drum Jan - Mar 1964
DPG N/A 5
Flower Drum I February - April and August - September, 1964
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 129
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 139
Folded Arrow Apr - May 1968
SS 337 USS Carbonero 118
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 134
Green Mist Mar - Apr 1967
DPG N/A 46
Half Note August - September 1966
LT-2085 Light Tug 2085 1
SS 337 USS Carbonero 104
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 129
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 133
High Low 11 January - 26 February, 1965
DDG-15 USS Berkeley 341
DD-870 USS Fechteler 246
LST-1168 USS Wexford County 198
APA-220 USS Okanogan 329
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 6
Magic Sword May 1965
DPG N/A 15
YAG-39 USS George Eastman 114
Pine Ridge May - June 1966
Land Base Land Base 90
Purple Sage 5 January - 3 February, 1966
DD-833 USS Thomas 310
Red Oak Apr - May 1967
DPG N/A 24
Scarlet Sage February 9 - 4 March, 1966
DD-833 USS Thomas 356
Shady Grove 22 January - 9 Arpil, 1965
LT-2086 Light Tug 2086 11
LT-2085 Light Tug 2085 10
LT-2081 Light Tug 2081 9
LT-2080 Light Tug 2080 10
LT Light Tug 3
YAG-40 USS Granville S. Hall 163
LT-2087 Army Light Tug 2087 12
DIV-40 Division 40 5
Tall Timber April - June 1966
Land Base Land Base 135
West Side 1 Jan - Feb 1965
DPG N/A 29
Yellow Leaf Feb 1964, Apr - May 1966
DPG N/A 184
Total Personnel 5,843
# Without SNs 359
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